Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 27

2013

Drafting a Sensible Conscience Clause: A Proposal for Meaningful
Conscience Protections for Religious Employers Objecting to the
Mandated Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives
Daniel J. Rudary

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Rudary, Drafting a Sensible Conscience Clause: A Proposal for Meaningful Conscience
Protections for Religious Employers Objecting to the Mandated Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives,
23 Health Matrix 353 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol23/iss1/27

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013

Drafting a “Sensible”
Conscience Clause:
A PROPOSAL FOR MEANINGFUL
CONSCIENCE PROTECTIONS FOR
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS OBJECTING
TO THE MANDATED COVERAGE
OF PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES
Daniel J. Rudary†
“[U]nder the new rule our institutions would be free to act in
accord with Catholic teaching on life and procreation only if they
were to stop hiring and serving non-Catholics . . . . Could the
federal government possibly intend to pressure Catholic institutions
to cease providing health care, education and charitable services to
the general public? Health care reform should expand access to
basic health care for all, not undermine that goal.”1
–Daniel Cardinal DiNardo, Archbishop of Galveston-Houston and
Chairman of the US Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Pro-Life
Activities

†

J.D. candidate, 2013, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.A., 2010, University of Richmond. The author would like to thank
Professor Sharona Hoffman and the Health Matrix Editorial Staff for their
guidance and assistance throughout the writing and editing process. The
author also acknowledges that on the eve of this Note’s publication, the
Obama Administration proposed significant changes to its contraceptive
coverage rules for religious institutions. Although these developments are
not addressed herein, it is his hope that this Note nevertheless underscores
why the mandate as originally conceived presented significant legal
problems that the administration and interested parties are now seeking to
alleviate through additional rulemaking. Accordingly, it is hoped that this
piece, despite its failure to address these most recent developments, may
still play a role in analyzing the legal framework behind this controversial
and very topical subject.

1.

HHS Mandate For Contraceptive And Abortifacient Drugs Violates
Conscience Rights, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS
(Aug.1, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-154.cfm.
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Introduction
On May 17, 2009, President Barack Obama took the stage at the
University of Notre Dame to make a commencement appearance that
was, by his own admission, “not . . . without controversy.”2 Upset by the
University’s decision to bestow an honorary doctor of laws degree on a
pro-choice President, many in the Catholic community called on Notre
Dame to rescind Mr. Obama’s invitation and reaffirm its commitment to
the Church’s teaching on the sanctity of human life. During his speech,
the President attempted to mollify these concerns and achieve broader,
bipartisan support for health care reform by calling for “a sensible
2.

President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at the University of
Notre Dame (May 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-notre-dame-commencement.

354

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause

conscience clause” rooted in the need to ensure that “all of our health
care policies are grounded not only in sound science, but also in clear
ethics.”3
Less than a year after his speech at Notre Dame, President Obama
laid the cornerstone of his domestic agenda by signing the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or Act) into law,
fundamentally reforming the nation’s health care system and spawning a
political and legal debate that led all the way to the Supreme Court.4
While the law’s most controversial component has undoubtedly been the
so-called “individual mandate” to purchase health insurance, a similarly
passionate debate regarding the law’s implications for religious
employers has also brought the Obama Administration into direct
conflict with the Catholic Church.5
The ACA regulates the national health insurance market by directly
regulating group health plans and health insurance issuers. One of the
provisions of the Act mandates that health plans provide coverage
without cost sharing for women’s preventive care and directs the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine which
services are to be covered under the mandate.6 On August 1, 2011, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor,
and the Department of the Treasury promulgated an interim final rule
3.

Id.

4.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

5.

The author acknowledges that bona fide objections to the HHS mandate
have been raised by a variety of religious bodies, including orthodox Jewish
and Protestant communities. Because a compelling interest analysis under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires a determination as to
whether or not a regulation burdens a specific plaintiff’s religious beliefs,
however, this Note will limit itself to addressing whether the theological
and moral objections raised by Catholic employers translate into a viable
cause of action under the Act. As courts applying the RFRA have
acknowledged, it is much easier to conduct a free-exercise analysis in the
context of hierarchical religions like Catholicism as opposed to other bodies
with less-definite and less well-known teachings. See, e.g., Mack v.
O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that certain
tests for applying the RFRA require courts “to determine the authoritative
sources of law for the religion in question and to interpret the commands
emanating from those sources. In the case of hierarchical religions such as
Roman Catholicism, this process of identification and interpretation, which
resembles the procedures of legal positivism, is feasible. In the case of
nonhierarchical religions, however, such as Islam, Judaism, and a multitude
of Protestant sects, the process is infeasible, or at least very difficult and
attended with a high degree of indeterminacy.”).

6.

Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006).
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on mandated preventative care that required all group health plans and
health insurance issuers to provide, without cost sharing, all
contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).7
The Catholic Church, however, has consistently taught that the use
of contraception is gravely sinful.8 While the HHS mandate includes an
exemption for “religious employers,” Catholic hospitals, universities, and
charitable organizations have taken issue with its narrow criteria,9 which
require that a “religious employer” (1) have the primary purpose of
inculcating religious values, (2) primarily employ only those who share
its beliefs, (3) primarily serve individuals of the same faith, and (4)
qualify as a nonprofit organization under Sections 6033(a)(1) and
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.10
Rather than promoting the “sensible” compromise that President
Obama spoke about at Notre Dame, Church leaders argued that this
exemption has the effect of limiting conscience protections to religious
organizations “that do not reach out to the world.”11 Notre Dame
President Fr. John Jenkins, who originally lauded President Obama’s
2009 commencement address as a roadmap for seeking common ground
between the Administration and the Church, subsequently outlined the
university’s “impossible position” of either paying for “contraception and
sterilization in violation of the Church’s moral teaching” or
discontinuing “employee and student health care plans in violation of the
Church’s social teaching.”12

7.

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug.
3, 2011); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011); Women’s Preventive Services:
Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS.
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Feb. 16,
2013).

8.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2370, at
570 (1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM] (‘“[E]very action which, whether in
anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the
development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as
a means, to render procreation impossible’ is intrinsically evil.”).

9.

Joan Frawley Desmond, Obama Administration Approves Mandated
Contraception Coverage, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/obama-Administration-approvesmandated-contraception-coverage/.

10.

45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).

11.

Desmond, supra note 9.

12.

Letter from John I. Jenkins, President of the University of Notre Dame, to
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Sept. 28,
2011) [hereinafter Jenkins Letter], available at http://president.nd.edu/
assets/50056/comments_from_rev_john_i_jenkins_notre_dame_3_.pdf.
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Fr. Jenkins was not the only one concerned with the implications of
a rule requiring religiously affiliated employers to subsidize
contraception. Following the Administration’s announcement, Catholic
churches across the country mobilized to fight the HHS mandate and
draw the nation’s attention to the issue of religious liberty. On Sunday,
January 29, 2012, priests across the country stood in their pulpits and
read a letter from the American bishops charging the Administration
with “[casting] aside the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States,” and threatening civil disobedience if compelled to
conform to the mandate.13 Recognizing that this issue transcended
Catholic teaching and spoke to broader constitutional concerns, secular
publications began to enter the fray and opine that the President had
“awakened a sleeping giant” with a decision that would have dire
political consequences.14 Others insinuated that by requiring Catholic
institutions to purchase contraception, the Administration was pursuing
a “re-election agenda that requires an end to freedom of religion.”15
In response to these concerns, President Obama directed HHS to
study solutions that would preserve the Administration’s policy on
access to preventive care while respecting the free-exercise rights of
religious employers.16 Subsequently, when the Administration finalized
its interim rule on preventive care on February 10, 2012, President
Obama announced that the HHS would initiate a further rulemaking
procedure to modify the application of the mandate to religious
employers.17 During this process, the Administration is extending a
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to “non-exempt, non-profit religious
organizations” that will be in place until the first plan year that begins
on or after August 1, 2013.18

13.

Peggy Noonan, A Battle the President Can’t Win, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4-5,
2012, at A15; Letter from Richard Lennon, Bishop of Cleveland, to the
Diocese of Cleveland (Jan. 26, 2012) (on file with author).

14.

Noonan, supra note 13.

15.

Kevin O’Brien, Contraception or the Constitution?, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 26, 2012, at A7.

16.

Remarks on Preventive Health Care Insurance Coverage and an Exchange
with Reporters, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Feb. 10, 2012)
[hereinafter Remarks].

17.

See id.; see also Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 77 Fed Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) (announcing the intention of the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury to
establish alternative ways to fulfill the mandate’s requirements when
coverage is sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that is not
exempt under the final regulations published February 15, 2012.).

18.

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501, 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012).
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Notwithstanding the President’s compromise, the HHS mandate has
continued to engender considerable legal controversy19 and may very well
remain vulnerable to a free-exercise challenge. To understand why, it is
necessary to review both the religious and the legal issues at stake in this
debate. Accordingly, Part I of this note will ask whether mandated
contraceptive coverage actually has the potential to violate an
employer’s religious beliefs. Having concluded that compelling Catholic
institutions to facilitate access to contraception would transgress deeply
held religious values, Part II will assess whether the mandate’s
requirements (as modified by the President’s February 2012 compromise)
actually impose this burden on religious employers.
To redress these concerns, Part III will analyze what—if any—cause
of action these organizations have under the Supreme Court’s recent
free-exercise decisions. As state courts applying this jurisprudence have
shown, however, the doctrine handed down by the Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith poses an
insuperable obstacle to free-exercise challenges against regulations like
the HHS mandate that are facially neutral and generally applicable.
Notwithstanding Smith, the HHS mandate’s facial neutrality and
general applicability do not necessarily insulate it from a free-exercise
challenge under current federal law. Accordingly, Part IV will analyze
the mandate’s requirements in light of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)20 in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal. This Note
will argue that, unlike the failed challenges decided under Smith, a
challenge to the federal HHS mandate is buttressed by the Supreme
Court’s application of the RFRA in O Centro, which upheld the RFRA’s
compelling interest test and empowered courts to fashion individualized
exemptions to federal laws that burden religious exercise.21
Having concluded that the mandate’s contraception coverage
requirement is unlikely to satisfy the RFRA’s compelling interest
analysis, Part V will put forth the proposal that, short of repeal, the
mandate’s exemption criteria should be broadened to provide “sensible”
conscience protections to institutional religious employers who are
currently placed in “an impossible position” by the mandate’s limited
exemption. Should the Administration fail to follow this course, it is
likely that federal courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court in O
Centro, will create specific exemptions for as many religious institutions
19.

See, e.g., Michelle Bauman, Forty-Three Catholic Organizations File
Lawsuits Against HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (May 21, 2012,
10:39 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/forty-three-catholicorganizations-file-lawsuits-against-hhs-mandate/.

20.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2008).

21.

Id.; Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006).
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that decide to challenge the mandate under the RFRA. Ultimately, this
legal quagmire can be avoided by the implementation of a “sensible”
conscience clause that will ensure “our health care policies are grounded
not only in sound science, but also in clear ethics.”22

I. Does Facilitating Access to Contraception Violate
Bona Fide Religious Beliefs?
Despite protests that the federal mandate impermissibly burdens the
freedom of Catholic institutions to act in accordance with their religious
beliefs, many Americans are at a loss as to why the nearly ubiquitous
practice of contraception would lead to a showdown between church and
state. On the one hand, the Catholic Church claims that facilitating
such coverage (even for non-Catholic employees) would transgress its
deeply held moral values. On the other hand, supporters of the mandate
argue that ecclesiastical institutions are simply searching for a
theological peg on which to hang an objection rooted not in moral
conviction, but in an unwillingness to pay for valuable and necessary
medical services.23
A.

Whose Burden? The Economic Cost of Failing to Cover
Contraceptive Products and Services

From an economic perspective, any burden associated with an
individual’s choice to use contraception does not hinder the religious
exercise of Catholic employers; rather, it falls on the backs of cashstrapped single women and working families who cannot afford to live
without it. Accordingly, for those who support the Administration’s
decision, including the numerous Catholic women who use birth control,
the HHS mandate is “both laudable and common-sense.”24 Failing to
enact such a measure would, in the words of former Maryland
Lieutenant-Governor Kathleen Kennedy-Townsend, “deny a benefit to a
whole class of workers—including hundreds of thousands of nonCatholics—who want it, need it, and are legally entitled to it.”25
The case is even more sympathetic for non-Catholics employed by
Church-affiliated institutions. And although contraceptive pills, patches,
and rings only cost up to $60 for a month’s supply, this out-of-pocket
expense can be daunting for the estimated 11 million women of

22.

Obama, supra note 2.

23.

See, e.g., Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, Out of Step with the Flock:
Bishops Far Behind on Birth Control Issues, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2011,
9:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/12/out-ofstep-with-the-flock-bishops-far-behind-on-birth-control-issues/249703/.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.
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reproductive age who live below the poverty level.26 Even with insurance
coverage, which typically covers only a portion of the costs associated
with prescription contraceptives, these expenses can still constitute up to
29 percent of a woman’s personal expenditures for health services.27 For
these women, an inability to cover the costs associated with
contraception often results in a decision not to use birth control.28 In
that case, employers (and society at large) may be required to pay the
even higher costs associated with unwanted pregnancies, miscarriages,
and abortions.29
According to advocates of prescription contraceptive coverage, this
formula is a recipe for financial disaster. For a full-term pregnancy,
medical costs can rise to $8,619, while a miscarriage or abortion will
cost, respectively, $1,038 and $416.30 Alternatively, insurance coverage of
contraceptives can provide significant savings for employers. Certain
studies, for example, have shown that private employers pay less in
medical benefits every year for each employee who receives contraceptive
coverage.31 These findings are supported by similar trends in public
benefit spending. According to the Guttmacher Institute, for example,
every public dollar invested in contraception can save up to $3.74 in
Medicaid expenditures for care related to unplanned pregnancies.32
Additionally, it was estimated that the services performed at family
planning clinics saved $5.1 billion in 2008.33 With these economic
26.

Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services
and Supplies Without Cost Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POLICY REV. 7, 9
(2011); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TESTIMONY OF GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE
SUBMITTED TO COMMITTEE ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 7 (2011) [hereinafter GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY],
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf.

27.

GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 8.

28.

Health-Care Law Holds Tremendous Promise for Women’s ReproductiveHealth Care, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 3 (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/birth-control-healthypregnancies-affordable-care-act.pdf; Christopher G. Kuhn, An EPICC
Oversight: Why the Current Battle for Access to Contraception Will Not
Help Reduce Unintended Pregnancy in the U.S., 17 HEALTH MATRIX 347,
352 (2007).

29.

Insurance Coverage for Contraception: A Proven Way to Protect and
Promote Women’s Health, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION 2
(Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/birthcontrol-insurance-coverage.pdf.

30.

Id.

31.

See, e.g., Promoting Healthy Pregnancies: Counseling and Contraception
as the First Step, WASH. BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH 8
(Sept. 20, 2000), http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pdfs/healthy
pregnancy.pdf.

32.

Sonfield, supra note 26, at 10.

33.

Id.
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benefits in mind, it is undoubtedly in an employer’s best financial
interests to cover the costs of employees’ birth control and, in doing so,
reduce
its
own
expenses
and
the
number
of
unwanted pregnancies that may end in abortion.
Advocates of mandated prescription contraceptive coverage also
point to the more intangible benefits that birth control can provide for
women in contemporary society. In promulgating its final rule, HHS
noted that access to contraception improves the social and economic
status of women by giving them the option to participate more fully in
economic and political life.34 Because women use birth control more than
men, however, these benefits are often overshadowed by the out-ofpocket costs that are unique to female preventive care. In the judgment
of the Administration, providing such care without cost-sharing is one
way to level the playing field for men and women by reducing sexspecific healthcare costs.35
Accordingly, if the federal birth control mandate benefits employers
by reducing long-term health care costs, does not require anyone to use
birth control, and simply makes it more affordable for those who do,
how can Catholic institutions claim that the federal government is
substantially burdening their free-exercise rights?
B.

Catholic Teaching on Artificial Contraception

While it is undoubtedly clear that an employer’s best economic
interests mitigate in favor of making contraception more readily
available, Catholic institutions have insisted that facilitating the use of
these products and services will impermissibly burden their free exercise
of religion.36 To understand the gravity of the Church’s concerns, and
whether or not they are actually implicated by the revised rule, it is
necessary to understand the Church’s moral position with regard to both
using contraception and cooperating in its procurement.
While many Christian and non-Christian religions condemn extramarital sex, homosexual acts, masturbation, pornography, and
polygamy, the Catholic Church remains the only mainstream religious
body to condemn contraception as “intrinsically evil.”37 This teaching
has its roots in both the Bible and the teachings of early church fathers
like Augustine of Hippo, who taught that “[t]hey who resort to
[contraceptives], although called by the name of spouses, are really not

34.

See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147).

35.

Id.

36.

See Desmond, supra note 9.

37.

CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570.
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such; they retain no vestige of true matrimony, but pretend the
honourable designation as a cloak for criminal conduct.”38
Today, the Church presents its teaching on artificial contraception
as part of a holistic understanding of human sexuality that respects both
the unitive and the procreative aspects of the marital act. Sexual
intercourse is procreative in the sense that its natural, biological end is
the creation of new life. Furthermore, sexual activity is unitive insofar as
it forges an intimate bond between a man and a woman that brings the
two together in order to ensure the proper care, upbringing, and
education of that young life. By frustrating either end of the sexual
act—the unitive or the procreative—the Church teaches that a couple
acts contrary to God’s will as it has been revealed to man by natural
law.39
The HHS mandate, however, encompasses more than just pregnancypreventing drugs. It covers the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive
services and products, including the morning-after pill.40 These drugs
operate post-conception to inhibit the implantation of an embryo,
“blur[ring] the line between birth control and abortion.”41 Because
Catholic belief holds that life begins at the moment of conception,42 the
compelled subsidization of these products by Catholic institutions would
force them to participate in a practice that the Second Vatican Council
denounced as an “unspeakable crime.”43
From the Church’s perspective, the only morally acceptable form of
birth control is natural family planning—the practice by which
38.

AUGUSTINE, 1 ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE—WHAT IS SINLESS
IN THE USE OF MATRIMONY? WHAT IS ATTENDED WITH VENIAL
SIN, AND WHAT WITH MORTAL? (419), available at http://www.ccel.org/
ccel/schaff/npnf105.xvi.v.xvii.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).

39.

PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER HUMANAE VITAE, paras. 12-13: AAS 60
(1968),
available
at
http://www.catholicsociety.com/documents/
paul_vi/Humanae_vitae.pdf; see Genesis 38:9–10; Deuteronomy 23:1.

40.

See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147) (requiring coverage, without cost-sharing, for all FDA approved
contraceptive methods); see also Birth Control Guide, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/ucm118 465.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (listing the “morning after pill” as an FDA
approved contraceptive).

41.

Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of
Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to
Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 753 (2005).

42.

CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2270, at 547.

43.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, GAUDIUM ET SPES, para. 51 (1965), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docum
ents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html; CATECHISM, supra
note 8, §§ 2270-2272, at 547-48.
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intercourse is relegated to the infertile periods of a woman’s reproductive
cycle. Because this practice acts in conformity with (and not against)
nature, its use has been sanctioned by the Church as a means by which
couples may regulate pregnancy.44
The Church’s moral concerns, however, are not limited to the
immediate act of using artificial contraception. Writing on the issue in
1968, Pope Paul VI predicted that the widespread use of prophylactics
would “open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering
of moral standards.”45 Before his ascension to the papacy, Benedict XVI
also reflected that the disassociation of sexuality from procreation would
render all sexual acts equal, allowing man to express his sexual desires in
any way he sees fit.46 This, of course, would remove any moral
opprobrium from pornography, prostitution, and other behaviors
condemned by the Church as acts of sexual vice. With these principles in
mind, the Catholic Church’s teaching on contraception cannot be
considered as a stand-alone issue. Rather, it lies at the root of the
Church’s much more expansive and foundational teaching on the
sanctity of human life, which, according to Pope John Paul II, must be
“defended with maximum determination.”47
While the Church teaches that the guilt of sin is normally incurred
by individual behavior, it also forbids actions that, while not specifically
sinful, lend “material cooperation” to morally dubious conduct.48 This
cooperation may be formal or material.49 Formal cooperation occurs
when one takes part in the sinful act of another and thus shares the
principal’s intent to commit the offense in question.50 Material
cooperation, on the other hand, does not involve sinful intent. Rather, it
occurs when one gives assistance to another’s sin by an act that is in and
of itself not morally wrong.51 Such material cooperation may be
immediate or mediate.52 One gives immediate material cooperation to the
44.

PAUL VI, supra note 39, at paras. 15-16.

45.

Id. at para. 17.

46.

JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER WITH VITTORIO MESSORI, THE RATZINGER
REPORT 85 (Salvatore Attanasio & Graham Harrison trans., 1985).

47.

JOHN PAUL II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI: THE VOCATION AND THE MISSION OF
THE LAY FAITHFUL IN THE CHURCH AND IN THE WORLD sec. 38, at 108
(1988).

48.

CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 1868, at 457 (“[W]e have a responsibility for
the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them . . . .”) (emphasis
in original).

49.

THOMAS J. HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN: THE SCIENCE
(The Bruce Publishing Co. rev. ed. 1958).

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 342.
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sin of another when he or she takes part in the other’s sinful act—albeit
the cooperator does not share the mens rea of the principal.53 Mediate
material cooperation, on the other hand, occurs when one performs an
act that is “preparatory to another’s sin.”54 Accordingly, the Church
would consider facilitating access to contraception to be at least mediate
material cooperation because it facilitates conduct that is inherently
sinful. Theologians, however, have argued that the HHS mandate
actually threatens Catholic employers with immediate material
cooperation in evil, as they would be paying for health plans that
provide direct access to “free” contraception.55
Because the guilt of sin may be imputed to actions that pave the
way for wrongdoing, the Church teaches that even mediate material
cooperation in evil should be avoided whenever possible.56 Immediate
material cooperation, on the other hand, is “never legitimate.”57 Because
the HHS mandate would compel employers to facilitate access to
contraception, objecting religious institutions would necessarily have to
choose between following the law (and materially cooperating in sin) or
discontinuing employee health benefits.58 By forcing a religious employer
to make such a decision in order to comply with the law, however, the
requirements of the HHS mandate may very well constitute a
“substantial burden” on the free exercise of religion.59
53.

Id. (explaining that immediate material cooperation, albeit without sinful
intent, occurs when one plays an active role in another’s wrong). An
example is an individual assisting in a robbery because she was threatened
with death. The individual is providing immediate material cooperation to
the sinner, but her cooperation would not be considered intrinsically wrong
because she was acting under duress.

54.

Id.

55.

Benjamin Mann, Moral Theologians Reject Catholic Writer’s Defense of
HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:07 AM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/moral-theologians-rejectcatholic-writers-defense-of-hhs-mandate/.

56.

HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 341 (“The general law of morality is that man
must avoid evil as far as he can and the specific law of charity bids him to
prevent his neighbor from doing wrong to the best of his ability . . . but at
times the principle of double effect may be applied. Since the material cooperator does not intend the evil of the principal’s act, whenever his own
act is good or indifferent and he has a proportionately grave reason for
acting, his co-operation will be licit.”).

57.

Mann, supra note 55.

58.

See Jenkins Letter, supra note 12 (outlining the University of Notre
Dame’s position of either paying for contraceptives in violation of the
Church’s moral teaching or discontinuing employee and student health
plans in violation of the Church’s social teaching).

59.

See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
718 (1981) (defining a substantial burden as one that “put[s] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”);
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II. Does the HHS Mandate Require Catholic
Employers to Violate Their Religious Beliefs?
On February 15, 2012, the interim final rule requiring that all health
plans and health insurance issuers provide contraceptive services with no
cost-sharing was finalized “without change.”60 Even so, the
Administration announced that it will work with religious employers
over a one-year period to “find an equitable solution that protects
religious liberty and ensures that every woman has access to the care
that she needs.”61 During this process, the Administration is extending a
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to “non-exempt, non-profit religious
organizations” that will be in place until the first plan year that begins
on or after August 1, 2013.62
While these proposed accommodations do not yet have the force of
law, the Administration has initiated a rulemaking procedure during the
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to modify the manner in which the
HHS mandate is applied to non-exempt religious employers.63 The
proposed modifications will require insurance companies to offer
insurance without contraceptive coverage to objecting institutions and
simultaneously offer contraceptives to those institutions’ employees
without cost-sharing.64 A similar (but yet-to-be defined) provision will
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (burden is substantial if it
forces a person to “choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”). Many of the
Circuits have articulated definitions of “substantial burden” consistent
with this example. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir.
2004) (defining a substantial burden as one that “truly pressures the
adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly
violate his religious beliefs”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that a substantial burden can
“result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious
precepts . . . .”).
60.

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).

61.

Remarks, supra note 16.

62.

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012).

63.

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147); Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012).

64.

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501, 16,505-06 (“This means that contraceptive coverage would not be
included in the plan document, contract, or premium charged to the
religious organization. Instead, the issuer would be required to provide
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also be implemented for non-exempt religious employers who selfinsure.65
In promulgating its decision to accommodate the concerns of
religious employers, the Administration asked that insurers, who will be
required to provide contraceptive coverage directly to the employees of
objecting institutions, offer such services free of charge.66 This decision
was based on studies showing that contraceptive coverage is at least
cost-neutral after factoring in the savings generated by a reduction in
pregnancies and related pre-natal care.67 Accordingly, the Administration
expects that “issuers would pay for contraceptive coverage from the
elimination of the need to pay for services that would otherwise be used
if contraceptives were not covered.”68 Specifically, while actuarial firms
have found that the cost of adding prescription contraceptives to
employee health plans is about $26 per enrolled woman, these costs are
effectively mitigated by savings that can add up to $97 annually per
employee.69
Despite the claims that providing contraceptive coverage is “cost
saving,”70 recent studies have shown that providers who are compelled to
offer these services free of charge may have to pass costs down to their
customers, including religious employers. One nation-wide survey of
pharmacy directors, for example, revealed that none of the respondents
believed mandated contraception coverage would reduce overall costs by
limiting unplanned pregnancies.71 One pharmacy director even went so
far as to remark that “[w]hen mandates are put in place, organizations

participants and beneficiaries covered under the plan separate coverage for
contraceptive services . . . without cost sharing.”).
65.

Id. at 16,506.

66.

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147) (“Under this approach, the Departments will also require that, in this
circumstance, there be no charge for the contraceptive coverage.”).

67.

Id.; see also JOHN BERTKO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THE COST OF COVERING CONTRACEPTIVES THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE
(2012).

68.

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501, 16,506 (Mar. 21, 2012).

69.

BERTKO ET AL., supra note 67.

70.

Id.

71.

REIMBURSEMENT INTELLIGENCE, PAYER SURVEY: CURRENT CONTRACEPTION
BENEFIT STRUCTURE AND ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF MANDATED NO-COST
ACCESS FOR ALL MEMBERS 3 (2012).

366

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause

have an opportunity and need to raise prices, change cost structures, and
pass along additional costs to our customers.”72
Harvard University economics professor Greg Mankiw has also
concluded that any change for religious employers under the modified
rule is simply a matter of semantics.73 Because all insurance costs will be
passed on to a religious employer through its premiums, and those
insurance costs will necessarily include the “free” contraceptives that the
insurer must offer to a religious institution’s employees (without
imposing any cost on them), the employer will inevitably have to pick
up the tab.74 These findings have reinforced concerns that despite the
President’s compromise, religious employers will still be compelled to
subsidize contraception by bearing the substantial, albeit less visible,
burden of “free” birth control coverage through their premiums.75
Accordingly, Church leaders have warned that the Administration’s offer
to exclude contraceptives from religious employer health plans is
“illusory” because under the revised rule, “[e]veryone doing business with
insurance companies—employers and employees alike—[will] be paying
for [contraception].”76
Even if objecting religious employers were in no position to
financially subsidize contraceptives, religious liberty advocates have
argued that the Administration’s proposed accommodation still presents
them with the moral dilemma of “triggering” access to sinful products
and services.77 According to this argument, even though an employer
may not be required to directly purchase birth control, the fact that it
offers any plan to its employees means that participants and
beneficiaries will simultaneously receive access to “free” contraception
via the employer’s insurer as a benefit of employment.
This is not an argument about some speculative future harm.
Rather, it is what the HHS mandate actually requires all non-exempt
72.

REIMBURSEMENT INTELLIGENCE, PAYERS SAY BIRTH CONTROL MANDATE
WILL INCREASE PREMIUMS (Feb.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://reimbursementintelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/
Contraceptive-Press-Release_FINAL1.pdf.

73.

Greg Mankiw, Semantics at the Highest Level, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (Feb.
11, 2010), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2012/02/semantics-at-highestlevel.html.

74.

See id.

75.

Michelle Bauman, Insurers Do Not Believe Contraception Mandate Will
Cut Costs, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 22, 2012, 2:24 AM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/insurers-do-not-believecontraception-mandate-will-cut-costs/.

76.

Mann, supra note 55.

77.

Mark Rienzi, ROLL CALL: Nothing Changes with Obama’s Birth Control
Compromise, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.becketfund.org/nothing-changes-with-obamas-birth-controlcompromise/.
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religious employers to do.78 By simply offering healthcare benefits, an
employer is ensuring that its employees will receive “free” access to birth
control through that employer’s insurer, even if the contraceptives are
not “directly” covered under the employer’s plan. While it may be
argued that simply paying employees also “triggers” access to morally
objectionable products and services, it must be noted that each employee
chooses what to do with the money she earns. Up until now, religious
employers were also able to choose what to offer their employees with
regard to health insurance and benefits. The ability to make this choice
led many Catholic institutions to exclude contraceptive coverage from
their employee benefit plans.79 Under the HHS mandate, however, any
religious employer that offers health insurance to its employees will, by
default, have no choice about whether their insurance provider will offer
employees, as a benefit of their employment, contraceptives and
abortion-inducing drugs. Accordingly, the President’s proposed
compromise “changes nothing of the moral substance” behind religious
employers’ objections because they will still have to provide and pay for
insurance that, one way or another, covers products that they object
to.80
Because such activity would directly facilitate the sin of another, a
Catholic employer cannot, in good conscience, comply with the
mandate.81 The only way around this dilemma is to try to fit within the
mandate’s narrow “religious employer” exemption (by only hiring and
serving co-religionists) or to cease providing health benefits altogether.
Far from solving the employer’s problem, however, these solutions would
either force the organization out of the public sphere or lead to
substantial fines and penalties under the ACA.82
78.

Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501, 16,506 (Mar. 21, 2012) (requiring insurance issuers to provide
contraceptive coverage to participants and beneficiaries covered under a
religious employer’s plan).

79.

Louise Radnofsky, Schools Navigate State Birth-Control Patchwork, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2012, at A2 (noting that even when faced with state-level
contraceptive coverage requirements, Catholic institutions were able to
avoid covering contraceptives by moving to self-insured plans, which are
regulated by the federal government and not the states. Under the HHS
mandate, however, these institutions can no longer avoid providing
contraceptive coverage through their insurance plans.).

80.

Open letter from John Garvey, President of the Catholic University of
America, et al. (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Garvey Letter], available at
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Unacceptable-223-6pm.pdf.

81.

For a discussion on the doctrine of material cooperation, see supra Part
I.B.

82.

The ACA does not require employers to provide health insurance coverage
for their employees. If, however, an employer retains fifty or more full time
employees and any of these employees have to obtain insurance through an
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Supporters of the President’s compromise have argued that indirect
cooperation with morally questionable behavior can hardly amount to a
religious burden when it is practically unavoidable in a modern,
interconnected economy.83 An individual’s tax contributions, for
example, may very well go to fund government activities that he or she
considers to be immoral. In response, religious leaders have clarified that
this issue is not analogous to what the government chooses to do with its
resources. Rather, it is about whether religious employers have “the
freedom in their own right not to facilitate something that violates the
tenets of their own faith.”84 Formerly, these institutions would have had
the freedom to exclude coverage for products or services they deemed to
be immoral. Now, however, any religious employer offering health
insurance is placed in the position of extending to its employees, through
its insurance provider, the “free benefit” of contraceptives and abortioninducing drugs.85 The fundamental question that courts will have to
address is whether any of these concerns actually burden a religiously
affiliated employer’s free exercise of religion. To that extent, it will be
necessary to review applicable free-exercise law under both the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Exchange because the employer does not offer insurance or it is not
“affordable,” the employer will face financial penalties beginning in 2014.
Should a Catholic institution with at least fifty employees choose not to
offer health coverage due to the contraceptive mandate, it would be subject
to these penalties if and when its employees sought alternative insurance
through
an
Exchange. HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, SUMMARY OF
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER PPACA (P.L. 111-148) 1, 3
(2010), available at http://www.ltgov.ri.gov/smallbusiness/employer
provisions.pdf.
83.

David Gibson, Contraception Objections Fail Catholic’s Moral Reasoning,
USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/religion/story/2012-02-14/catholic-bishop-morals-birth-controlcontraception/53095538/1.

84.

Conscience, Not Contraception, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLIFE OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.aaplog.org/get-involved/letters-to-members/conscience-notcontraception/ (quoting testimony of Rabbi Meir Soloveichik before the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on Feb. 16, 2012).

85.

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147) (requiring that while a religious employer may be offered a policy that
excludes contraception, their insurer shall simultaneously offer the
employees of that institution any FDA-approved contraceptive drug or
service free of charge).
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III. Mandated Prescription Contraceptive Coverage
and the Supreme Court’s Free-Exercise Jurisprudence
If the HHS mandate threatens to burden the free-exercise rights of
religious employers, it must satisfy the limitations placed on government
entanglement in religious belief and practice articulated in the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”86 To date, at least
one judge has gone so far as to describe the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions interpreting the First Amendment’s religion clauses as
“whimsical” and “somewhat erratic.”87 Given the capricious nature of the
Court’s free-exercise decisions over the past half century, such a criticism
is not without merit.
A.

The Supreme Court’s “Whimsical” and “Erratic” Free-Exercise
Jurisprudence—From Sherbert to Lukumi

From 1963 until 1990, the Supreme Court construed the FreeExercise Clause of the First Amendment to require that any law
burdening religious exercise either directly or indirectly must be (1)
justified by a compelling state interest and (2) narrowly tailored to
satisfy that interest.88 This balancing test outlined by the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner was subsequently rejected by the majority in
Employment Division v. Smith.89 In Smith, two members of the Native
American Church were denied unemployment benefits because they were
fired for smoking peyote, which was deemed to constitute work-related
misconduct.90 Because their peyote use took place in the context of a
Native American religious ceremony, the employees brought suit to
challenge their denial of benefits as a violation of the Free-exercise
Clause.91 Finding against them, the majority held that “an individual’s
religious beliefs” do not ”excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”92 If not,
the Court feared, individuals would use their religious beliefs as a basis
for non-compliance with valid state laws regulating public health, safety,

86.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

87.

Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 98
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting).

88.

See Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).

89.

See Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990).

90.

Id. at 874.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 878-79.
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and welfare.93 Accordingly, the Smith Court concluded that if a law is
facially neutral and generally applicable, the First Amendment does not
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply.”94
The product of a divided Court, the Smith decision was roundly
criticized by the dissenting justices. Justice O’Connor, for example,
lamented how “today’s holding dramatically departs from well-settled
First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the
question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty.”95 Justice Blackmun’s
dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, also
suggested that the majority’s opinion was an overreaction and would
have dire consequences for the First Amendment.96
Three years later, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, the Court fused Smith with Sherbert to create a new, twopart test for analyzing free-exercise claims.97 Henceforth, in order to
prevail on a free-exercise claim, a plaintiff would have to show that a
challenged law is (1) not neutral and generally applicable, per Smith,
and is (2) not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, as
defined in Sherbert.98 Nevertheless, even after Lukumi, Smith remained
the operative test for Free-Exercise cases because a showing that a
challenged law is generally applicable and facially neutral will preclude
any inquiry into the state’s compelling interest under Sherbert.
B.

Unsuccessful Challenges to State Contraceptive Mandates
Under Smith

Concerned with the implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in 1993 to restore Sherbert’s strict scrutiny analysis of laws burdening
religious exercise.99 The RFRA was subsequently held unconstitutional as
applied against state governments in City of Bourne v. Flores.100
Accordingly, free-exercise challenges brought by religious employers in
response to state contraceptive coverage laws predating the HHS
93.

Id. at 879.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

96.

Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

97.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).

98.

Id. at 531-32.

99.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(b)(1)
(2008).

100. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1997). For a detailed
discussion of the RFRA and the Supreme Court’s application of the law to
both the states and the federal government, see infra Part III.A.
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mandate have been evaluated under Smith’s facial neutrality and general
applicability test. As the two cases below will demonstrate, Smith has
posed “an insuperable obstacle” to the free-exercise claims of religious
employers who have sought to be exempted from mandated
contraceptive coverage.101
In a lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court of California applied Smith
to uphold the State’s prescription contraception coverage law in Catholic
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court.102 There, Sacramento’s
Catholic Charities challenged the California Women’s Contraceptive
Equity Act on the grounds that it violated the religion clauses of both
the federal and the state constitutions.103 Significantly, the court noted
that Smith “would at first glance appear to dispose of [the plaintiff’s]
free exercise claim.”104 Because the Act’s requirements applied neutrally
and generally to all employers (regardless of religious affiliation), the
court found that they did not target religious practice without advancing
a legitimate secular interest.105 As such, the Act satisfied Smith’s
requirement that a valid law, in addition to being generally applicable,
also be “neutral” toward religion. Any perceived antipathy toward
Catholicism, the court noted, was not the result of the mandate itself,
but of its narrowly tailored exemption which, although it failed to
include many Catholic institutions, was a proper exercise of legislative
discretion.106 Just because the exemption did not encompass all Catholic
organizations, the court reasoned, did not mean that the law was drafted
as an attack on the Catholic Church.107
The New York Court of Appeals closely followed the reasoning of
the California Supreme Court when it ruled on a similar challenge
brought against New York’s contraceptive coverage mandate. In Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, the plaintiffs challenged the
exemption for religious employers codified in New York’s Women’s
Health and Wellness Act (WHWA) as “unconstitutionally narrow.”108
101. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y.
2006).
102. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 98
(Cal. 2004).
103. The California Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act includes a provision in
the California Health and Safety Code and a provision in the California
Insurance
Code.
See
CAL.
HEALTH
&
SAFETY
CODE
§ 1367.25 (West 2005); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2005).
104. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 82.
105. Id. at 82-84.
106. Id. at 83-84.
107. Id. at 84-85.
108. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y.
2006).
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This statute employed the same exemption that is codified in
California’s Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act and currently codified in
the HHS mandate.109 Applying the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith
and Lukumi, the New York court held that “the First Amendment has
not been offended.”110 Specifically, the court looked to the legislature’s
intent in passing the WHWA to conclude that it was passed “to
eliminate disparities between men and women in the cost of health care,”
and hence, “[r]eligious beliefs were not the ‘target’ of the WHWA”; it
was “not that law’s ‘object’ to interfere with plaintiffs’ or anyone’s
exercise of religion.”111 As such, the law passed muster as a “neutral law
of general applicability” capable of withstanding a free-exercise challenge
under Smith.
Given the similarity of the federal HHS mandate to these state-level
regulations, it is likely that a court considering a First Amendment
challenge from religious employers would also follow Smith and rule in
favor of the government. This failure to move beyond the question of a
law’s objective neutrality, however, would preclude a court from
answering important questions about whether a generally applicable,
facially neutral law can nevertheless impose a significant burden on
religious exercise. To redress these concerns, it will be necessary for
religious employers to attack the HHS mandate through a legal venue
that subjects the government’s case to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.

IV. The Federal Contraceptive Coverage Mandate in
Light of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
A.

Congress’s Response to Smith: The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Catholic Charities of
Diocese of Albany, “Smith is an insuperable obstacle” to religious
employers challenging a facially neutral, generally applicable
contraceptive-coverage mandate.112 Recognizing that Smith “virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion,” Congress
acted to redress this imbalance in federal free-exercise jurisprudence by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.113
Importantly, Congress recognized that “laws ‘neutral’ toward
religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
109. See supra notes 9-10 (summarizing the exemption’s provisions).
110. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, 859 N.E.2d at 464.
111. Id.
112. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, 859 N.E.2d at 465.
113. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1)
(2008).
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interfere with religious exercise.”114 After Smith, however, the burdens
imposed on religious belief and practice by generally applicable, facially
neutral laws could not be redressed by the courts. Nevertheless, Congress
concluded that “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing . . . governmental interests.”115
Accordingly, the RFRA sought to restore the strict-scrutiny analysis
laid down in Sherbert by requiring that “the government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability” unless it “is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”116 The RFRA also
provides a vehicle for obtaining “appropriate relief against a
government” by “a person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of [the Act].”117
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court invalidated the
RFRA as it applied against the states on the grounds that it exceeded
Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.118 Nevertheless,
the Act has been applied to federal law as a valid exercise of Congress’
Article I enforcement power. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the Supreme Court applied the RFRA to
the case of a religious sect that sought an exemption from the Controlled
Substances Act in order to use a hallucinogenic tea (hoasca) in its
rituals.119 Finding that the RFRA contemplated that the courts would
create exemptions to generally-applicable federal laws in order to relieve
the free-exercise burdens on individual claimants, the majority held that
the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest for
prohibiting plaintiffs’ religious use of hoasca.120 Significantly, the Court
recognized that an analysis under the RFRA would have to be contextspecific and tailored to the government’s interest in burdening the
religious exercise of each specific plaintiff.121 As such, the justices ruled
that it was not enough for the government to simply assert a general
interest in the uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act.122
114. § 2000bb(a)(2).
115. § 2000bb(a)(5).
116. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b).
117. § 2000bb-1(c).
118. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
119. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006).
120. Id. at 434, 439.
121. Id. at 430-31.
122. Id. at 435.
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Rather, any law challenged under the RFRA must withstand a
compelling interest analysis that is tailored to both the plaintiff’s
individual religious obligations and the government’s interest in
burdening those obligations in each case.
B.

Preliminary Showings Required by the RFRA

Before a court can assess whether or not a federal law satisfies the
compelling interest test laid down in the RFRA, a claimant must first
show that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. As a
threshold matter, a plaintiff may be required to articulate the scope of
his beliefs, show that these beliefs are indeed religious, and prove that
they are sincerely held.123 If he can then show that these beliefs have
been substantially burdened, the government must demonstrate that the
regulation or practice at issue furthers a compelling interest and employs
the least restrictive means of doing so.124
As discussed in Part I above, the Catholic Church has consistently
condemned the use of contraception as an unnatural
sexual practice that renders one guilty of grave sin.125 Accordingly,
Catholic employers who accept this teaching cannot materially
cooperate in the sin of another by facilitating direct access to
contraceptive products and services through their insurance plans.126
Even though many Catholics do not consider this to be an obligatory or
central teaching of their faith, the RFRA protects “any exercise
of religion”127 and does not “focus . . . on the centrality of the
particular activity to the adherent’s religion but rather
on . . . whether the adherent’s sincere religious exercise is substantially
burdened.”128
When considering whether a Catholic institution’s religious exercise
would be “significantly burdened” by the HHS mandate, it will be
helpful to review the definitions and principles used by courts who have
considered similar questions in the past. Although the “RFRA does not
explain what constitutes a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise of
religion,” many courts have derived a useful definition from the Supreme
123. United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2007).
124. Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 1999).
125. See supra Part I.B. Courts analyzing RFRA claims frequently consider
whether a religious practice is mandated or merely encouraged by a
particular faith. See, e.g., Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702, 703 (D.
Md. 1996). In this case, contraception has been unambiguously condemned
by the Church, and Catholics are prohibited from using it under pain of
mortal sin. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570.
126. See supra Part I.B.
127. Protection of Religious Exercise in Land Use and By Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a) (2008).
128. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Court’s pre-Smith decisions.129 Accordingly, a government regulation
may run afoul of the RFRA if it “put[s] substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify [her] behavior and to violate [her] beliefs” or “forces
an individual to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion.”130 Courts have also recognized that a substantial burden exists
when a law “forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that
manifests a central tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.”131 Most recently,
the Supreme Court’s opinion on the constitutionality of the ACA has
made it clear that a federal mandate to purchase a product would not
pass constitutional muster if it abridged the First Amendment’s
guarantee of religious liberty.132
Here, a case can be made that the HHS mandate will force a
religious employer to engage in conduct contrary to her beliefs by
compelling her to purchase a health insurance plan that provides free
access to contraceptives and abortion-inducing drugs. As discussed
above,133 a government mandate that extends, through an employer’s
insurer, contraceptives and abortion-inducing drugs to all employees “no
matter where [they] work”134 would render any Catholic employer who
offers health insurance a material cooperator in sin, albeit an unwilling
one.135 Prior to this mandate, Church-affiliated institutions were free to
limit their coverage so that employees who wanted contraception would
have had to purchase it using their own funds and through a source
unaffiliated with their employer.136 Now, a religious institution will have
129. United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of
Friends, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
130. Id.
131. Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996); see Gibson v.
Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 223 F.3d 1256
(11th Cir. 2000).
132. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A mandate to
purchase a particular product would be unconstitutional if, for example,
the edict impermissibly abridged the freedom of speech, interfered with the
free exercise of religion, or infringed on a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.”).
133. See supra Part II.
134. Remarks, supra note 16.
135. See Mann, supra note 55 (acknowledging the argument that a religious
employer “‘might not have involvement or knowledge of a separate
contract . . . between employee and insurer’ to receive contraception
without a co-pay, since these agreements would be strictly between the
insurer and employee.”).
136. See Radnofsky, supra note 79.
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no choice but to offer employees insurance that provides “free” birth
control as a benefit of employment.137 As one prominent Catholic
employer surmised, “we would still be in the untenable position of
facilitating access to drugs that go against our beliefs.”138
Furthermore, although religious institutions are not forced to choose
between acting in accordance with their faith and a government benefit,
they would certainly be exposed to a government penalty if they chose
not to provide health coverage because of their objections.139
Undoubtedly, this is the kind of coercion and pressure that the RFRA
seeks to alleviate when facially neutral regulations conflict with bona fide
religious belief. Arguably, the Administration has conceded this point by
retaining the mandate’s “religious employer” exemption in the wake of
the President’s compromise.140 Had his modification actually relieved the
free-exercise burdens on non-exempt religious institutions, there would
be no need to preserve an exemption that offers even more protection to
qualifying organizations. Nevertheless, the fact that the Administration
has finalized this exemption “without change”141 suggests that while the
words used to describe the mandate may have been modified, its moral
consequences for religious employers remain unaffected.142

137. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147) (requiring that while a religious employer may be offered a policy that
excludes contraception, the insurer shall simultaneously offer the employees
of that institution any FDA-approved contraceptive drug or service free of
charge).
138. Michael P. Warsaw, Contraception, Against Conscience, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/why-ewtn-wontcover-contraception.html.
139. See CHAIKIND & PETERSON, supra note 82, at 136.
140. Garvey Letter, supra note 80. (“[I]t bears noting that by sustaining the
original narrow exemptions for churches, auxiliaries, and religious orders,
the Administration has effectively admitted that the new policy (like the
old one) amounts to a grave infringement on religious liberty.”); Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)
(indicating that the religious employer exemption to the HHS mandate is
finalized “without change.”).
141. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
142. See Garvey Letter, supra note 80. (“This so-called “accommodation”
changes nothing of moral substance and fails to remove the assault on
religious liberty and the rights of conscience which gave rise to the
controversy.”).
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The Burden Shifts: Does the HHS Mandate Survive the RFRA?

If a religious employer is able to make a prima facie case that its
free-exercise rights are burdened by the HHS mandate, the government
will have had to show that the regulation satisfies the compelling
interest test prescribed by the RFRA.
1.

Does the Mandate Further a Compelling Government Interest?

The first prong of the RFRA’s compelling interest analysis focuses
on whether the government regulation at issue furthers a compelling
state interest. As the Supreme Court noted in O Centro, this analysis
can only be satisfied through an application of the challenged law to the
particular claimant whose sincere religious exercise is being substantially
burdened.143 As such, a court evaluating a challenge to the federal
contraceptive mandate by a Catholic institution would have to consider
whether the government has a compelling interest to require the
extension of contraceptive benefits to a religious institution’s employees.
In addition to being narrowly tailored to the limited scope of this
analysis, the regulation in question would also have to advance interests
of “the highest order.”144 While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
yet to define what exactly those interests are, it has nevertheless made
clear that a mere rational relationship to some colorable interest will not
suffice.145
In this case, the government has advanced the interest of promoting
women’s health and saving healthcare costs by making preventive care,
including contraception, more readily available.146 This argument is,
143. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2006).
144. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993).
145. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
146. See GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 12. Other government
efforts to mandate contraceptive coverage by employers have been justified
as promoting the equal treatment of women in the workplace. These
arguments have been based on Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, and in 2000 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ruled that employers who exclude contraception from
prescription health plans discriminate along gender lines. EEOC Decision
on
Coverage
of
Contraception,
EEOC
(Dec.
14,
2000),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. While some
district courts have acknowledged that combating such discrimination is a
“compelling state interest ‘of the highest order,’” Werft v. Desert Sw.
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)), the appellate courts have
not accepted this argument. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices
Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not encompass contraception and that the denial
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among other things, premised on the proposition that unplanned
pregnancies will lead to adverse health effects.147 While this may very
well be true, remedying the situation by making a religious employer
facilitate access to contraception through its health plan would not
further the government’s interest in any appreciable way.
First, it is not entirely clear that employed women who want to use
prescription contraceptives are unable to do so because their employers
do not cover them. While certain reports have indicated that women
who have unintended pregnancies did not use birth control because of
the financial cost, this data does not tell us whether these women are
employed and, if so, whether their employer’s refusal to cover
contraception was the cause of their inability to pay.148 Rather, it is more
likely that these statistics reflect the situation of unemployed women,
who would not be affected in the least if the government required
employers to facilitate access to birth control through their insurers.
Academic analysis sympathetic to the government’s interest has even
admitted that “women who are most at risk for unintended pregnancies
are the least likely to gain any advantage” from compelling an employer
to offer prescription contraceptives.149 To show that the federal mandate
would further the government’s interest of promoting greater access to
women’s healthcare, it would be necessary to demonstrate that women
who are beneficiaries of employer-sponsored health plans are unable to
afford to access birth control because their plans do not cover it.150 Given
the number of private employers who already cover prescription
contraceptives, this would be a difficult showing to make.
Today, 90 percent of private employers include contraception in
their benefit packages.151 The federal government, the nation’s largest
employer,152 also includes contraceptives in its employee health plans.153
Requiring that this coverage also be provided by a small minority of
employers who have chosen not to offer it would, per the Supreme
Court’s own jurisprudence, hardly constitute a compelling state
of contraception coverage for both sexes does not discriminate against
female employees in violation of Title VII).
147. Stabile, supra note 41, at 770-71.
148. Id. at 771.
149. Kuhn, supra note 28, at 367 (emphasis added).
150. Stabile, supra note 41, at 771.
151. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN BRIEF: FACTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE
UNITED STATES (2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/fb_contr_use.pdf.
152. Career Guide to Industries, 2010-11 Edition: Federal Government, U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
LABOR,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (noting
that the federal government is the nation’s single largest employer).
153. GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 11.
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interest.154 Even if it did, the government cannot defeat a claim under
the RFRA by arguing that a compelling interest is served by the
uniform application of a law. Rather, it has to show that the state has a
significant interest in regulating the particular plaintiff who is
challenging that law.155
Furthermore, prescription contraceptives like the FDA-approved
drugs encompassed by federal mandate are not the only means to
regulate pregnancy. Just because the pill may be more convenient than a
condom does not make it a basic health care need, especially when
contraceptive drugs pose far more health risks156 than these more
affordable and more readily available methods of birth control.157
Certainly, it is not the case that a woman would be foreclosed from
regulating her pregnancies using these methods if her employer chose not
to cover prescription contraceptives.
Finally, “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the
highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly
vital interest unprohibited.”158 Under the ACA, any “grandfathered”
group health plans that were in effect on March 23, 2010, are not
required to comply with the HHS mandate, and employers who retain
less than fifty full time employees are not subject to penalties for failing
to offer coverage.159 This exemption, which has the potential to
encompass tens of millions of Americans,160 would necessarily defeat any
154. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011)
(noting that “[f]illing the remaining modest gap” in a government
regulatory scheme “can hardly be a compelling state interest”).
155. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 435 (2006).
156. The Dark Side of Birth Control: 17 Adverse Health Effects, THE HEALTH
CRAZIES (May 11, 2010), http://mphdegree.org/2010/the-dark-side-ofbirth-control-17-adverse-health-effects/ (collecting medical studies showing
seventeen distinct health risks posed by oral contraceptives).
157. Stabile, supra note 41, at 772.
158. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547 (1993) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989)
(Scalia, J. dissenting)).
159. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug.
3, 2011) (“The requirements to cover recommended preventive services
without any cost-sharing do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”); see
also 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2011) (providing shared responsibility for
employers offering health coverage).
160. The US Census Bureau reports that over 20 million people are employed
by firms with fewer than twenty employees. This figure does not consider
the number employed by firms ranging from 20-49 employees, nor the
number of employees whose health plans will be “grandfathered” under the
ACA. See Statistics about Business Size, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).

380

Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause

claim that the government’s interest in mandating that Catholic
employers facilitate access to contraceptive coverage through their
insurers is one of the “highest order.” While the O Centro Court opined
in dicta that the government might be able to demonstrate “a
compelling interest . . . by offering evidence that granting the requested
religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to
administer the program,” the fact that the law in this case does not even
apply uniformly to non-religious employers renders this argument
untenable.161
2.

Is the Mandate the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a
Compelling Governmental Interest?

Even if the HHS mandate did further a compelling governmental
interest, it does not employ the least restrictive means of doing so. To be
the least restrictive means of accomplishing the legislature’s goal, a law
that burdens religious exercise must be both substantively and facially
neutral. In terms of the First Amendment, a facially neutral law is one
whose intent is neither to confer a benefit nor impose a burden on the
practice of religion.162 Substantive neutrality, on the other hand, requires
that the government “minimize the extent to which it either encourages
or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance.”163 By definition then, a law that is truly
“substantively neutral” toward religion will use the least restrictive
means to further a governmental interest. If not, courts may fashion
exemptions to relieve claimants from these burdens.164
In this case, the HHS mandate lacks substantive neutrality because
it is not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s
interest. Specifically, its narrow “religious employer exemption” burdens
religious exercise by imposing arbitrary distinctions between churchaffiliated activities and institutions which the government has deemed to
be “religious” and those which it has deemed to be “secular.” In doing
so, the government has ignored the bona fide religious beliefs that form
the core of these institutions’ mission, identity, and purpose, and has
presented them with the choice of either modifying their religious
practice or incurring substantial fines and penalties.

161. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
435 (2006).
162. Craig W. Mandell, Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether Catholic Institutions
Are Obligated Under Title VII to Cover Their Employees’ Prescription
Contraceptives, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 199, 22022 (2008).
163. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990).
164. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 434.
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While hospitals, schools, and charities may not be “churches” in the
strict sense of the word, their activities are central to a holistic
understanding and practice of the Catholic faith. As such, they are not
considered by the Church to be mere auxiliary or supplementary
organizations simply related to Catholicism by historical accident. As
Pope Benedict XVI taught in his encyclical letter Deus caritas est,
The Church’s deepest nature is expressed in her three-fold
responsibility: of proclaiming the word of God (kerygma-martyria),
celebrating the sacraments (leitourgia), and exercising the ministry
of charity (diakonia). These duties presuppose each other and are
inseparable. For the Church, charity is not a kind of welfare
activity which could equally well be left to others, but is a part of
her nature, an indispensable expression of her very being.165

Because the activities of Church hospitals, schools, and charities are
inseparable from Catholic belief and worship, a “religious exemption”
that excludes these bodies suffers from a “crabbed and constricted” view
of religion that, in the words of California’s Justice Brown, would
“define the ministry of Jesus Christ as a secular activity.”166
Nevertheless, it would seem that the narrow exemption offered by
the federal mandate is an attempt to do just that. Unfortunately, this is
remarkably consistent with recent efforts by the Administration to
downplay the role of religious exercise in the public square. Rather than
embracing the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment,
for example, the Administration’s use of the more restrictive term,
“freedom of worship,” in many of its public statements reflects an
understanding that legally protected religious exercise should be limited
to the four walls of a church, synagogue, or mosque.167 Not surprisingly,
then, the religious employer exemption to the federal mandate was
drafted to create a “religious accommodation that respects the unique
relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial
positions.”168 Because such an understanding fails to acknowledge that
the free exercise of religion encompasses more than scheduled Sunday
165. BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST 25 (2005).
166. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 106
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting)
167. Ashley Samelson, Why “Freedom of Worship” is Not Enough, FIRST
THINGS (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www.firstthings.com/
onthesquare/2010/02/why-ldquofreedom-of-worshiprdquo-is-not-enough
(analyzing the Obama Administration’s substitution of the term “freedom
of religion” with the more restrictive “freedom of worship” and arguing
that this rhetorical paradigm shift threatens to leave vital religious liberties
unprotected).
168. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug.
3, 2011) (emphasis added).
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worship services, it fails to respect the full breadth of legally protected
religious freedom and, consequently, cannot be the least-restrictive
means (in First Amendment terms) of furthering a governmental
interest.169
Even so, state courts upholding mandated contraceptive-coverage
laws have argued that it would be impossible for a legislature to fashion
a religious exemption if it were not permitted to determine which
organizations are truly religious and which are secular.170 These opinions
have gone to great lengths to show that the line drawing that results
from this determination is not religious discrimination of the sort that
was condemned by the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente.171 In that
case, the Court held that a Minnesota statute that excluded the
Unification Church from an exemption to registration and reporting
requirements for charitable organizations constituted discrimination
against a specific religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.172
Nevertheless, focusing on governmental bias against certain religions
would tend to misconstrue the constitutional principles at stake in this
debate. In asking for a broader exemption, Catholic employers are not
insisting that legislatures abandon their duty of drawing sensible
distinctions between those bodies deserving of exemption and those that
are not.173 Nor should they argue that these exemptions constitute
religious discrimination. Unlike the Unification Church in Larson,
Catholicism as a denomination is not entirely excluded from the federal
mandate’s statutory exemption scheme.174 Accordingly, the proper
169. It is a well-established principle of constitutional jurisprudence that
religious exercise as protected by the First Amendment encompasses much
more the freedom to worship as one chooses. See Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981) (acknowledging that
“religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They
exercise their religion through religious organizations and these
organizations must be protected by the [Free-Exercise] [C]lause.”)).
170. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d
67, 79-80 (Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859
N.E.2d 459, 468-69 (N.Y. 2006). It should be noted, however, that these
cases were decided under Smith and therefore did not consider whether the
exemptions at issue were the least restrictive means of furthering the
government’s interest.
171. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 228 (1982).
172. Id.
173. Indeed, the Supreme Court has sanctioned this as a “permissible legislative
purpose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
174. The narrow exemption in the federal mandate may still protect Catholic
institutions if their primary purpose is religious indoctrination and they do
not hire and serve non-Catholics. Consequently, just because the
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analysis in this case should focus not on whether the exemption fosters
religious establishment (because it plainly does not), but on whether it
sufficiently protects religious exercise. When viewed in this light, a
narrow exemption that fails to alleviate the significant burdens on
countless church-affiliated institutions cannot be said to protect the full
scope of constitutionally protected religious freedom as it has been
defined and understood by the courts.175
When the state has attempted to stifle religious exercise by imposing
narrow definitions of religion on faith-based institutions, it has
consistently met with judicial rebuke. In National Labor Relations Board
v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, for example, the Supreme Court
considered whether Catholic high schools were entitled to an exemption
from NLRB jurisdiction over collective bargaining units for lay teachers
and staff.176 While the NLRB maintained that its policy was to decline
jurisdiction over religiously sponsored organizations “only when they are
completely religious, not just religiously associated,”177 the Court found
that this determination would necessarily involve some degree of
entanglement between church and state.178 Accordingly, the Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the NLRB’s distinction
between “completely religious” and “religiously associated” organizations
was “a simplistic black or white, purported rule containing no borderline
demarcation of where ‘completely religious’ takes over or, on the other
hand, ceases.”179 Because such an inquiry would implicate “very sensitive
questions of faith and tradition,”180 the Supreme Court declined to
extend the NLRB’s authority to the schools for fear that “intrusion into
this area could run afoul of the Religion Clauses and hence preclude [the
NLRB’s] jurisdiction on constitutional grounds.”181
Lower courts have applied a similar analysis to cases involving
government attempts to define religiosity. When, for example, Colorado
sought to exclude “pervasively sectarian” institutions of higher education
from its state scholarship program, the Tenth Circuit found that the
exemption does not cover all Catholic institutions does not mean that it
discriminates against Catholicism along the lines condemned in Larson. See
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 85, n.10.
175. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 491, 493 (1979).
177. Id. at 493 (quoting Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 NLRB
249, 250 (1975)).
178. See id. at 499.
179. Id. at 495 (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118
(7th Cir. 1977)).
180. Id. (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th
Cir. 1977)).
181. Id. at 499.
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state violated constitutional doctrine prohibiting government from
measuring an institution’s religious beliefs and practices.182 By far, the
“most potentially intrusive element” of Colorado’s statutory scheme was
the requirement that the state determine whether the school in question
had the “primary purpose” of proselytizing students.183 Because these
statutory metrics for determining whether an institution is sufficiently
religious for the purposes of government regulation have been
consistently condemned by the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Colorado statute at issue violated the First Amendment.184
In University of Great Falls v. National Labor Relations Board, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also
applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Catholic Bishop to conclude that
a church-affiliated university did not fall under the authority of the
NLRB.185 There, the Board asserted jurisdiction based on a finding that
the university in question, owned by the Roman Catholic Sisters of
Providence, did not have “a substantial religious character” because “the
propagation of a religious faith” was not “the primary purpose” of the
school.186 In making this determination about the religious mission of the
university, however, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Board had
“engaged in the sort of intrusive inquiry that Catholic Bishop sought to
avoid.”187 Because the Board’s “substantial religious character” test
boiled down to the question of whether an institution is “sufficiently
religious,” the court denounced it as an inquiry into religious views that
is “not only unnecessary but also offensive.”188 Deciding that this test
would create the same constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court
sought to avoid in Catholic Bishop, the court roundly denounced the
NLRB’s practice of “trolling through the beliefs of the University,
making determinations about its religious mission, and that mission’s
centrality to the ‘primary purpose’” of the school.189
Importantly, and germane to the federal mandate at issue here, the
court acknowledged that narrow definitions of religion fail to consider
the breath of religious freedom protected by the First Amendment. Just
because the University of Great Falls was “ecumenical and openminded” did not “make it any less religious, nor NLRB interference any

182. Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 795 (2000)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1263.
185. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
186. Id. at 1340.
187. Id. at 1341.
188. Id. at 1341, 1343.
189. Id. at 1342.
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less a potential infringement of religious liberty.”190 Analogously, limiting
an exemption to religious institutions that engage in “hard-nosed
proselytizing,” limit their enrollment “to members of their religion,” and
have “no academic freedom,” would be “an unnecessarily stunted view of
the law.”191 This, in turn, would threaten to violate the basic premise
underlying the First Amendment’s religion clause—”not to prefer some
religions (and thereby some approaches to indoctrinating religion) to
others.”192 Because the NLRB’s narrow definition of a religious
institution mirrors the standard articulated by the “religious employer”
exemption to the HHS mandate, it is likely that the denunciation of that
test as “constitutionally infirm” would similarly apply to the
government’s exemption scheme in this case.
To determine eligibility for the HHS mandate’s religious employer
exemption, for example, the government will necessarily have to decide
whether an institution’s understanding and practice of its religious
mission translates into a primary purpose of “inculcating religious
values.”193 For a Catholic hospital, school, or charity that inculcates
religious values by serving others, the answer is quite obvious.
Nevertheless, the federal government would probably disagree, and
because “the prospect of church and state litigating . . . about what does
or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment,” a court is
likely to find that the HHS mandate’s narrow exemption is not the
“least restrictive” means of furthering a governmental interest.194

V. A “Sensible” Solution
If Catholic institutions are able to demonstrate that the HHS
mandate significantly burdens their free-exercise rights in violation of the
RFRA, federal courts are empowered to create individualized exemptions
that will be as numerous as there are Catholic hospitals, universities,
and charities that choose to challenge the mandate in court.195 While
some initial challenges to the mandate have been dismissed because the
rulemaking process is not yet complete (and therefore claims by religious
organizations are arguably not yet ripe), other federal courts have
indicated that employers challenging the mandate have a high likelihood
190. Id. at 1346.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)(B)(1) (2011).
194. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977).
195. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
434 (2006) (“RFRA, however plainly contemplates that courts would
recognize exceptions—that is how the law works.”).
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of success on the merits.196 To avoid the litigious and administrative
nightmare that would result from this scenario, it is in the
Administration’s best interests to fashion a broader exemption that
would encompass organizations that, while not “churches” in and of
themselves, derive their purpose and mission from religious principles.
A.

Federalism-Based Solutions to the Contraceptive Coverage Dilemma

Expounding on the genius of the federalist system, the Supreme
Court described state sovereignty in New York v. United States as “not
just an end in itself: rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”197 As the Court would
later explain, this emphasis on subsidiarity in our federal system has
encouraged local policies “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society,” including “innovation and experimentation,”
which enables “greater citizen involvement in democratic processes” and
makes government “more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.”198
Consistent with their role as legislative laboratories that reflect the
diverse values and needs of the American people, many state legislatures
have already addressed the issue of prescription contraceptive coverage
by effectively balancing calls for equity in employee health care with the
moral concerns of their constituents. Although its exact origins are
unclear, it appears that the campaign for mandated prescription
contraceptive coverage began soon after insurance plans started covering
196. Two federal district courts have dismissed, for now, challenges to the
mandate on the grounds that because the Administration’s rule-making
process for applying the mandate to non-exempt religious employers is not
yet complete, religious institutions cannot satisfy “injury in fact” or
ripeness requirements for standing. See Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius,
878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012); Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dept.
of Health & Human Services, 877 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Neb. 2012). It
should be noted that neither of these courts reached the merits of the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment and RFRA claims. Because the temporary
enforcement safe-harbor only applies to non-exempt religious organizations,
however, private employers challenging the mandate on free-exercise
grounds have not been affected by standing or ripeness concerns. In
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012), for example,
Judge John L. Kane of the US District Court for the District of Colorado
granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting the government from
enforcing the mandate against Hercules Industries Inc., a private employer
challenging the mandate on free-exercise grounds. In his opinion, Judge
Kane found that any alleged governmental interest in enforcing the
mandate against Hercules “pales in comparison to the possible infringement
upon Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights.” Id. at 1295.
197. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
198. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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the male impotency drug Viagra.199 To date, twenty-eight states require
insurers who cover prescription drugs to provide coverage of the full
range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices.200 Twenty of
these states exempt certain employers from the mandate, usually for
religious reasons.201 In providing such an exemption, these state
legislatures have engaged in what the Supreme Court has sanctioned as
“a permissible legislative purpose” in order to “alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions.”202 Of these states, only five
have defined a “religious employer” using the terms adopted by the
Federal Government in the current mandate implementing the ACA.203
These include California, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, and
Oregon.204 Another five have used a similarly restrictive definition taken
from Section 3121 of the Internal Revenue Code.205 The remaining ten
199. Kuhn, supra note 28, at 355; see also Carey Goldberg, Insurance for
Viagra Spurs Coverage for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at
A1 (discussing the link between Viagra coverage and the demand for
contraceptive coverage). But see Stabile, supra note 41, at 770 (arguing
that there is no validity to the claim that contraceptive coverage is
necessary to promote equal treatment of women because Viagra coverage is
not analogous to contraceptive coverage).
200. These
states
include
Arizona, Arkansas,
California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. It should be noted, however, that
Michigan and Montana require insurance coverage of contraceptives as a
result of an administrative ruling or an Attorney General
opinion. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, INSURANCE
COVERAGE
OF
CONTRACEPTIVES
(2012),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1978).
203. See supra notes 9-10.
204. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(a) (1999); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A)
(McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-178 (West 2012); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 743A.066 (West 2008).
205. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121(w)(3)(A)-(B)
(2011) (defining a “church” as “a church, convention, or association of
churches, or an elementary or secondary school which is controlled,
operated, or principally supported by a church or by a convention or
association of churches” and a “qualified church-controlled organization” as
any tax-exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3) other than an
organization which “offers goods, services, or facilities for sale . . . to the
general public” and “normally receives more than 25 percent of its support
from either (I) governmental sources, or (II) receipts from admissions, sales
of merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in
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states employ a wide variety of religious exemptions, all of which use
broad language to define a religious employer that can claim an
exemption from the contraceptive coverage mandate.206 Many of these
states do not even attempt to define “religious employer” and accept any
bona fide religious objection as grounds for exemption from the mandate.
Arizona’s contraceptive coverage law, for example, provides that “a
religious employer whose religious tenets prohibit the use of prescribed
contraceptive methods may require that the accountable health plan
provide a health benefits plan without coverage for all federal Food and
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods.”207 Under this
exemption, all a religious employer is required to do is submit an
affidavit to the health plan provider stating that it is a religious
employer, at which point “the accountable health plan shall issue to the
employer a health benefits plan that excludes coverage of prescription
contraceptive methods.”208
Similarly, Delaware’s mandate provides an exemption to employers if
“the required coverage conflicts with the religious organization’s bona
fide religious beliefs and practices.”209 As with many other state
exemption statutes, the employer is then required to provide its
employees reasonable and timely notice of the exclusion. Missouri’s
statute extends the exemption from its contraceptive mandate beyond
churches and organizations to cover individual conscientious objectors as
well. In pertinent part, it provides that “[a]ny health carrier may issue to
any person or entity purchasing a health benefit plan, a . . . plan that
excludes coverage for contraceptives if the use or provision of such
contraceptives is contrary to the moral, ethical or religious beliefs or
tenets of such person or entity.”210
The success that many states have had in balancing prescription
contraceptive coverage with bona fide religious objections is evident from
activities which are not unrelated trades or businesses, or both.”). This
language would suggest that Catholic hospitals and universities, which
provide services for sale to the general public, would not be exempt from
state mandates using this definition of a “religious employer.”
206. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(F) (West 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-1104
(West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-530e (West 2010); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)(1)
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.119 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN.
§
689A.0417
(West
1999);
N.M.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 59A-46-44 (West 2012); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1369.108 (West 2012);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-16E-7 (LexisNexis 2011).
207. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(B) (West 2011).
208. Id.
209. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (West 2010).
210. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.119 (West 2012).
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the lack of any substantive legal or political challenges that have arisen
in the states that include a broad conscience clause in their mandate. To
date, the only evidence of political upheaval at the state level has been
found in New York and California, where institutional Catholic
employers have challenged their respective state contraceptive mandates
in court. Significantly, both of these states enforce the narrow “religious
employer” exemption that is currently codified in the federal mandate.
Looking to the example of states that have codified broader exemptions,
the federal government can avoid costly and time-consuming litigation
(and preserve goodwill with religious institutions) by adopting a more
inclusive exemption that would accommodate the conscientious
objections of institutional Catholic employers.
B.

Avoiding “Excessive Entanglement” Between Church and State:
Modeling a Broader Exemption on Section 414(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code

When he offered his accommodation to religious employers,
President Obama did not broaden the exemption already codified in the
HHS mandate.211 Rather, as discussed above, non-exempt religious
employers will still be compelled to facilitate access to “free”
contraceptive coverage for their employees simply by offering a health
plan.212 This modification, however, fails to alleviate significant freeexercise concerns because it compels a Catholic institutional employer to
materially cooperate in a practice that the Church condemns as
“intrinsically evil.”213
In his letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sibelius, Notre Dame
President Fr. John Jenkins suggested that the Administration look to
the language of Section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code as one
possibility for a broader religious exemption to the federal mandate.214
Defining religious organizations that are exempt from certain provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, Section 414(e) deems an organization to
be “associated with a church” and thus subject to exemption “if it shares
common religious bonds and convictions with that church.”215 Focusing
211. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)
(indicating that the religious employer exemption to the HHS mandate is
finalized “without change.”).
212. Id. at 8728. The HHS mandate requires that insurers simultaneously offer
health plans without contraceptive coverage to religious employers while
offering contraceptives free of charge to their employees. Such a scenario
guarantees free access to contraceptives for employees of Catholic
institutions so long as their employer offers health insurance.
213. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570.
214. Jenkins Letter, supra note 12.
215. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(D) (2006).
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on an institution’s organizational ties to religion rather than the nature
of its religious practice, such an exemption would avoid excessive
entanglement between church and state and, in doing so, further the
government’s interest in a less-restrictive manner.
In construing this Section, courts have articulated various tests that
expound on the letter and spirit of Section 414(e). The Fourth Circuit,
for example, has held that a determination of whether an organization
shares common bonds and convictions with a church turns on three
factors: “(1) whether the religious institution plays any official role in
the governance of the organization; (2) whether the organization receives
assistance from the religious institution; and (3) whether a
denominational requirement exists for any employee or patient/customer
of the organization.”216 Importantly, this analysis “does not ask about
the centrality of beliefs or how important the religious mission is to the
institution” and thus avoids excessive entanglement between church and
state.217
Because of their organizational ties with the Church, Catholic
hospitals, schools, and charities would likely be included in an exemption
based on institutional and organizational ties to religion. First, the
Catholic Church plays a direct and official role in the governance of its
hospitals, schools, charities, and other social service organizations. The
US Conference of Catholic Bishops, for example, promulgates Ethical
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, which, in
addition to defining the theological and moral principles underlying
Catholic health care, stipulate that “Catholic health care services must
adopt these Directives as policy, require adherence to them within the
institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment, and
provide
appropriate
instruction
regarding the Directives for Administration, medical and nursing staff,
and other personnel.”218 Furthermore, Catholic universities are governed
by the Apostolic Constitution Ex corde ecclesiae, which mandates that
church-affiliated institutions of higher learning “must have the
following essential characteristics”:
(1) A Christian inspiration not only of individuals but of the
university community as such; (2) A continuing reflection in the
light of the Catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human
knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research; (3)
Fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the
216. Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001).
217. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
218. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 12 (2009),
available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-anddignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-HealthCare-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf.
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Church; (4) An institutional commitment to the service of the
people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the
transcendent goal which gives meaning to life.219

Additionally, theology professors at Catholic universities must receive a
mandate to teach from the local bishop, and non-Catholic academics are
not permitted to comprise a majority of the institution’s faculty.220
These definitions of what constitutes an authentically Catholic
institution are by no means simple guidelines or suggestions. The Code
of Canon Law provides that “no undertaking is to claim the name
Catholic without the consent of competent ecclesiastical authority,”221
and in recent times Catholic bishops have acted to sever organizational
ties with institutions that have acted contrary to Church teaching.222
Additionally, many Catholic bishops and priests often serve as
presidents, trustees, and chief executive officers of Catholic hospitals,
universities, and charities.223 These institutions also receive direct
financial assistance from the Church and operate under the authority of
local bishops and other competent ecclesiastical authorities.224
In some cases, the organizational ties demanded by a Section 414(e)style exemption may not cover all employers objecting to the mandate
on free-exercise grounds. If such an exemption failed to alleviate a
burden on an organization’s bona fide religious exercise, however, it
219. JOHN PAUL II, EX CORDE ECCLESIAE 13 (1990).
220. Id. at Article IV, §§ 3-4, at 33.
221. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, CODE OF CANON LAW § 216 (1983), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__PU.HTM.
222. See, e.g., ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PHOENIX, DECREE REVOKING
EPISCOPAL CONSENT TO CLAIM THE “CATHOLIC” NAME ACCORDING TO
CANON 216 (2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/health/
documents/abortion/bishopdecree.pdf (explaining a Catholic bishop’s
decision to revoke the name “Catholic” from a hospital in his diocese that
provided contraceptive services and abortion).
223. See,
e.g.,
Our
Leadership,
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
USA,
http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/who-we-are/our-leadership/
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2013) (noting that as of February 2013, the President of
Catholic Charities USA is Rev. Larry Snyder); Lines Crossed: Separation
of Church and State. Has the Obama Administration Trampled on
Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience? Before the H.
Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of John Garvey, President of the Catholic University of
America),
available
at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/
stories/Testimony/2-16-12_Full_HC_Mandate_Garvey_Complete.pdf
(noting that twenty-four of CUA’s forty-eight elected board members must
be Catholic clerics).
224. Fred Kammer, 10 Ways Catholic Charities are Catholic,
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
USA
3
(1998),
available
at
http://www.ccmke.org/CatholicCharities/pdf/TenWays.pdf.
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could still have recourse to the courts, which may grant individual
exemptions to the mandate.225 Indeed, initial challenges to the law have
shown that despite their lack of institutional ties to religion, private
employers objecting to the mandate on free-exercise grounds may
nevertheless have a high likelihood of success on their claims.226
The adoption of a Section 414(e)-style exemption would, however,
relieve the courts of adjudicating the most serious claims brought by
institutional religious employers whose structural ties to the Catholic
Church require that they either break the law or act contrary to the
religious teachings that form the basis of their identity.

Conclusion
Ultimately, the balance between the interests of the secular state
and the conscientious objections of religious institutions cannot be
achieved by simple attempts to legislate “a wall of separation” between
the two. What the founders of this nation accomplished, and what we
can strive to achieve today, however, is a “sensible” balance between the
interests represented by these separate, yet equally important
participants in American democracy.227
Given the strength and vitality of religious institutions in American
life, this is a compromise that we cannot afford to put off. To date, the
emerging tensions between the Obama Administration and the Catholic
Church in the United States have led to increasingly strained relations
between the two.228 In response to the present controversy, Pope
Benedict XVI has asked that “the entire Catholic community in the
United States come to realize the grave threats to the Church’s public
moral witness presented by a radical secularism which finds increasing
expression in the political and cultural spheres.”229 Making an oblique

225. The Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged that the existence of a
legislative exemption does not preclude the courts from creating additional
exemptions under the RFRA. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006).
226. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (granting
preliminary injunctive relief to a private employer challenging the mandate
under the RFRA).
227. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67,
99 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“By protecting religious groups
from gratuitous state interference, we convey broad benefits on individuals
and society. By underestimating the transformative potential of religious
organizations, we impoverish our political discourse and imperil the
foundations of liberal democracy.”).
228. Jerry Markon, Catholic Groups’ Ire at Obama Is Growing, WASH. POST,
Nov. 1, 2011, at A1.
229. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops of the United States of
America on Their “Ad Limina” Visit (Jan. 19, 2012), available at
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reference to the HHS mandate, the Pope expressed his concern about
“certain attempts being made to limit that most cherished of American
freedoms, the freedom of religion,” including “efforts . . . to deny the
right of conscientious objection on the part of Catholic individuals and
institutions with regard to cooperation in intrinsically evil practices.”230
This, he noted, is indicative of a “tendency to reduce religious freedom
to mere freedom of worship without guarantees of respect for freedom of
conscience.”231 Pope Benedict’s sentiments have been echoed by a variety
of religious leaders, both Catholic and non-Catholic, who have made it
very clear that the controversy over the HHS mandate is not so much
about contraception as it is about the freedom of religious institutions to
determine their own policies on matters implicating faith and morals.232
This, of course, can be a difficult balance to strike when a religious
institution’s beliefs intersect with its responsibilities to provide adequate
health insurance coverage to its employees. Ultimately, however, a
religious institution being forced to cooperate in the proliferation of what
it deems to be sinful products and services simply by offering a health
plan raises concerns that transcend the morality of birth control. Rather,
this issue speaks to the right of all Americans to act in accordance with
their conscience without fear of governmental pressure or intrusion. In
asking for a broader exemption to the HHS mandate, Catholic
institutions are not demanding that their employees refrain from using
contraception. They are simply asking that the government acknowledge
their free-exercise interest in not cooperating with those who choose to
do so. Precisely because the HHS mandate’s narrow exemption places
Catholic institutions that reach out to the world in the “impossible
position” of offering such cooperation, Congress should act to repeal it;
given the political realities currently foreclosing that outcome,233
however, the rule should at least be modified with a “sensible”
conscience clause that will avert unnecessary conflict between Church
and State.

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2012/january
/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20120119_bishops-usa_en.html.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Michelle Bauman, US Clergy Declare ‘State of Emergency’ Over
Contraception Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 23, 2012, 2:05
AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/us-clergy-declare-state-ofemergency-over-contraception-mandate/.
233. Michelle Bauman, Senate Rejects Blunt Amendment to Defend Religious
Freedom, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 1, 2012, 1:31 PM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/senate-rejects-bluntamendment-to-defend-religious-freedom/.
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